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Evaluating Rights Litigation as a Form of
Transformative Feminist Politics
Judy Fudge
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University

A Review of CanadianFeminism and the Law: The Women's Legal Education
and Action Fund and the Pursuitof Equality by Sherene Razack, (1991) Toronto:
Second Story Press, 189 pp.

Is rights discourse and litigation a useful way to redress social inequality? Attempts
to answer this question have generated a lively debate, fuelled in Canada, in part,
by the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While there is no
common ground on whether rights litigation should be enthusiastically supported
or vigorously decried, both sides of the debate have agreed that there are some
difficulties with this strategy. Aspects of litigation politics which impose real
limits on its transformative potential include: the undemocratic structure of
litigation, the difficulties in translating arguments based on a social analysis of
subordination into legal categories and conventional legal analysis, and the ability
of opponents to progressive struggles to use rights discourse and litigation to
further their agenda.' But, despite a recognition of these problems, the general
tendency amongst progressives is to offer cautious support for this strategy. Any
emphasis on the shortcomings of rights litigation is countered by stressing its
potential to mobilize social movements, influence the general terms of political
debate, change a particular law or doctrine and introduce a variety of perspectives
2
and experiences into the courts which have historically been excluded. Defenders
1. Amy Bartholomew and Alan Hunt, "What's Wrong with Rights" (1990) 9 Law and
Inequality at 1; H.J. Glasbeek, "A No-Frills Look at the CharterofRights and Freedoms
or How Politicians and Lawyers Hide Reality" (1989) 9 The Windsor Yearbook of
Access toJustice at 293; Judy Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon
Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17
InternationalJournalof Sociology at 445; Michael Mandel, The Charterof Rights and
the Legalization of Politics(Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989).
2. Didi Herman, "Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation" (1990) 28
Osgoode Hall Law Journalat 789; PJ. Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
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of this strategy claim that rather than simply totting up the cases, rights litigation
should be evaluated in terms of how it contributes to the broader political agenda.
To this end, Elizabeth Schneider's insightful catechism is invoked:
Does the legal struggle generally and rights discourse in particular help build a
social movement? Does articulating a right advance political organizing and assist
in political education? Can a right be articulated in a way that is consistent with the
politics of an issue or that helps redefine it? Does the transformation of political
insight into legal argumentation capture the political visions that underlie the
movement? Does the use of rights keep us in touch with or divert us from
consideration
of and struggle around the hard question of political choice and
3
strategy?
Sherene Razack's CanadianFeminism and the Law provides an opportunity to
explore these questions in the context of the mobilization of elements of the
women's movement around the entrenchment of equality rights and the subsequent
decision to set up the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) in
order to pursue a litigation strategy to give meaning and substance to equality
rights for women. Razack frames the four chapters which describe and discuss the
origins of LEAF and the early results of its litigation strategy with an introduction
which maps the major barriers to the tranformation of liberal legal rights by
feminist jurisprudence and a conclusion which examines the success feminists in
law have had both in challenging rights thinking and obtaining concrete gains for
women. Canadian Feminism and the Law combines a well-written and careful
case study of LEAF's litigation strategy with a suggestive discussion of the
theoretical and practical limitations of rights litigation. Ultimately, Razack
cautiously endorses a rights litigation strategy. Finding out why she does, is a
useful point of entry into the rights debate.
In her introduction, Razack identifies the abstraction and individualism of
liberal rights as the major obstacle to the tranformative possibility of feminists
using the law to promote women's equality. According to Razack, liberalism's
.. concept of an independent, decontextualized self functions to suppress our
acknowledgment of the profound differences between individuals based on their
situation within groups and the profound differences between groups. Without a
theory of difference, we cannot make it clear what the relationship is between
groups or communities (p. 15).

3.

Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-CL. at 401; E. Schneider,
"The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement"
(1986) 61 N.Y.UL. Rev. at 589; Amy Bartholomew and Alan Hunt, "What's Wrong
with Rights" (1990) 9 Law and Inequality at 1.
Schneider, supra,note 2 at 622-23; Razack quotes this passage at 130-31.
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Drawing on the postmodem understanding of law as discourse, which she
describes as the creation of meaning and the power to regulate what is known,
Razack argues that applying feminism to law "requires confronting the boundaries
between self and community and coming to terms with the meaning of difference"
(p. 21). One way of doing this is to bring women's experience into the courts. But
as Razack explains, this process is fraught with difficulties: on the one hand,
getting the legal system to work for women will require the transformation of
traditional legal concepts, and, on the other hand, the strategy of emphasizing
women's experience tends to occlude the relations other than gender which
contribute to the specific forms of women's subordination. Despite these difficulties,
Razack concludes that it is important to look for the cracks in law where "women's
specifically female consciousness in so male a culture" might have "counterhegemonic impact" (p. 26).
Chapter One traces the change in the meaning of equality from fair play and
equal opportunity as used by feminists in the Report of the Royal Commission on
the Status of Women in 1970 to an emphasis on fair shares and substantive
inequality as developed by feminists during the entrenchment of the Canadian
Charterin the early 1980s. Razack shows how feminists used the constitutional
lobby as an opportunity to
...articulate precisely their vision of equality. The vision of fair shares, while not
unique to women, nonetheless became so refined during discussions of the Charter
that women, at least the professional legal elite, could continue to build on the
lobby once the Charter was a reality and prepare for the next phase of
charterwatching and litigation armed with a precise notion of what equality meant
and how they wanted to secure it through the law (p. 35).

The legal elite, as Razack characterizes LEAF's founders, were aware that the
successful entrenchment of equality rights was not enough by itself to improve
women's situation. They believed that what was needed was a way to ensure that
the government's and the courts' understanding of what equality for women
required was the same as their own. During the three years before the equality
rights were to become legally enforceable, feminist lawyers and academics,
joined by some of the more established women's groups, began to conduct statute
audits. In these audits, they examined ten areas of women's lives in order to put
feminists in a position to prove to the courts that a particular piece of legislation is
based on a policy of differentiation between the sexes which is illegitimate.
According to Razack, these women shared the conviction "that women could get
what they wanted through the system by getting 'the product,' which was a certain
way of thinking about equality, into public discourse" (p. 43). Thus, they decided
to establish a single national fund which would sponsor (preferrably winnable)
cases and engage in a complimentary strategy of legal education and lobbying. By
adopting an incremental litigation strategy, LEAF hoped to occupy the field of
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equality rights in the courtroom and educate the legal profession about women's
inequality.
Commenting upon LEAF's mandate, Razack notes, it"is striking how extensively
this approach to social change relied on the very liberal notion of the power of
reasoned argument" (p. 44). Significantly too, she argues, this vision of the role of
legal argument and rational choice contradicted these women's experience. The
professional women involved in the constitutional lobby were confronted by the
sex-specific nature of their treatment, one which stood in sharp contrast to the
experience of men with similar class and race backgrounds. Razack suggests that
it was "this sense of gender-based disadvantage that may have led to the resolutely
apolitical position taken by most of the women active on Charter issues" (p. 44).
Since their exclusion from the status quo was based solely on their gender, this is
what LEAF activists sought to use Charter litigation to address. Moreover, the
form of their activism, rights litigation, placed a high premium on extensive
fundraising since litigation is such an expensive business. This, in turn, reinforced
the elite nature of the activity and tended to separate LEAF from other women's
groups and broader political movements generally. And, as Razack elaborates,
LEAF's focus on fair shares or equality of results did not address the crucial
concern of what the standard or norm ought to be; instead, what equality litigation
does is accept the organization of society and ensure that men and women, for
example, obtain equal benefits. Razack quotes one LEAF activist as reflecting
that equality litigation "doesn't allow for wider policy innovations such as less
workaholism, lifelong learning, shifting values to peace, clean environments,
except indirectly" (p. 50). These factors worked together to inhibit LEAF from
developing a broader political vision and closer ties with other political movements.
Thus, LEAF's gaze was drawn towards the public realm, the realm of state action,
and away from the private world of the family and workplace.4
Although Razack does not discuss it, LEAF's decision to focus on the Charter
as the instrument of social change limited its political vision. Because the Charter
only applies to institutions of the state and its laws, private activity, except to the
extent it is specifically regulated by the state through law, is beyond the scope of
Charterredress. Through rights litigation, it is impossible directly to challenge a
labour market which has historically resulted in low paying, sex-segregated jobs
for women. Nor can one directly address the problem of women's (or men's, for
that matter) poverty. Although these social facts may be raised in court as
evidence of women's inequality, the Charter can only be used to attack any
inequalities embedded in or directly fostered by the law, it can not be used directly
to confront the social relations which give rise to these inequalities.5
4.

5.

Judy Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the
Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) Osgoode Hall Law
Journal at 485.
Glasbeek, supra,note 1.
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In Chapter Two, "LEAF's Litigation in Context," Razack examines "to what
extent the issues LEAF has taken up, and the manner which it has done so,
challenged the social order that oppress women and minorities, and what has been
the impact of this challenge?" (p. 68). In doing so, she provides a brief organizational
profile of LEAF and overview of its case selection criteria and its caseload during
its first three years. Again, Razack emphasizes how LEAF's decision to pursue a
proactive case litigation strategy and emphasize legal expertise isolated it from
other feminist political campaigns and organizations. As she notes, LEAF activists
were aware of this problem, but they believed that it was more important to
influence quickly equality rights jurisprudence, rather than to take the time to
develop connections with other women's organizations. They believed that this
could be done at a latter stage, once the organization had established its legal
credibility. She also shows how LEAF could not control the equality litigation
agenda; it was forced to respond to Charterchallenges. Specifically, the Charter
was used by LEAF's opponents to roll-back women's hard-won rights in the areas
of sexual violence against women and women's reproductive freedom. But
intervening in existing cases, rather than initiating and controlling litigation,
placed severe constraints upon LEAF's ability to frame issues and lead evidence
of women's experience. Despite some early Charterand some important human
rights decisions in the mid- 1980s, which established that courts should look at the
adverse impact of the operation of a law on disadvantaged groups, LEAF had an
uphill battle to persuade the courts to accept women's experience.
Razack claims that "[l]itigation as feminist activity embodies an obvious
contradiction: it is in essence the telling of women's stories in a language and a
setting structured to deny the relevance of women's experiences" (p. 51). LEAF
litigators tried to adduce evidence of women's experience in order to challenge
indirectly judicial stereotypes and to raise issues of power and oppression. But all
of this had to be accomplished within prevailing legal rules.
LEAF's early attempts to expand the scope of legal liberalism to accomodate a
feminist emphasis on context are described and analyzed in Chapters Three and
Four. The cases discussed in Chapter Three do not fit into any neat categories.
Razack's discussion of the individual cases is insightful and illuminating as she
provides LEAF's rationale both for how it approached these cases and the results
it sought. However, the cumulative significance of these cases and LEAF's
arguments is not apparent from Razack's analysis.
This is because Razack fails to examine the significance of the public/private
distinction and the relationship between the various institutions of the state on the
transformative potential of rights litigation. In this, she is simply reflecting a gap
in LEAF's own analysis. The public/private distinction is used by the courts to
determine the scope of the Charter'sapplication. For the Charterto apply, there
must be an element of public qua governmental action. Union constitutions,
collective agreements (in most cases), and contracts of employment, for example,
are examples of private action. What is significant is that Charterlitigation cannot
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be invoked to challenge private action directly. For this, equality rights advocates
must resort to human rights legislation which specifically prohibits discrimination in
the private sphere. This is what LEAF did in the Federationof Women Teachers of
Ontario case, 6 where it sought to defend the right of the FWTO to maintain a sexsegregated union structure, and in Brooks," where LEAF sought to persuade the court
that the failure to provide sick benefits to pregnant workers was a form of sex
discrimination. In these cases, state action, rather than being the cause of inequality,
is the sole avenue through which inequality can be challenged. Second, simply
winning the argument about women's inequality does not ensure that women's life
situations will be improved. Razack acknowledges this. However, she is heartened
by the watershed decisions in Schachter, where two levels of courts accepted
LEAF's arguments and decided to extend parental leave benefits for adoptive fathers
provided under the unemployment insurance scheme to natural fathers But what
Razack does not mention is the fact that the federal government responded to the first
decision in Schachter by reducing the number of weeks of benefits available to
adoptive parents from 15 to 10 weeks and providing adoptive fathers with the same
length of benefits. While this is clearly an improvement for natural parents (the 10
weeks parental leave can be used by the mother or father of the child), adoptive
parents are worse off. Moreover, there is nothing in the Charter which would prohibit
the goverment from abolishing sickness, maternity and parental benefits altogether
as part of a policy of fiscal restraint.9 When it comes to the question of whether or not
and how much social and economic resources will be allocated to a particular group
or program, the Charter's role is secondary at best, beside the point at worst. What
we need is positive state intervention in the private sphere of the market to ensure
greater equality, not protection of individual rights from the oppression ofa trespassing
state.
In Chapter Four, Razack shows how LEAF was able to bring women's experience
of domination and subordination into court in cases involving sexual harassment,
rape and women's reproductive choices. She identifies LEAF's argument in
Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Canada'0 as pathbreaking because the Supreme
6.
7.
8.
9.

Re: Tomen and Federationof Women Teachers Association of Ontario (1987), 66
D.L.R. (4th) 565 (Ont. C.A.).
Brooks, Allen, Dixon v. CanadaSafeway (1989) 89 C.L.L.C. 17,012 (S.C.C.); [1989],
1 S.C.R. 1219.
R. v. Schacter (1990), 90 C.L.L.C. 14, 005 (F.C.A.)
Razack reports that in November 1988 Attorney General of Ontario Ian Scott told his
audience that the recent modifications to the spouse-in-the-house rule which were
introduced as a result of a Legal Charter challenge had cost taxpayers $80 million. He
added: "I've got to give consideration to cancelling the whole welfare program for those
women. That way there won't be any discrimination because there won't be any benefit

given" (p. 130).
10. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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Court of Canada rejected the similarly situated rule (formal equality) and instead
adopted an approach to equality rights under the Charterwhich requires a court to
examine the historical disadvantage of a group and consider substantial inequality.
Although Andrews was not a case about women's daily reality, Razack claims
that LEAF used the approach it developed there in subsequent cases involving
sexual harassment and rape, thereby "revealing its contrast to an individualist,
rights-balancing perspective and confirming LEAF's growth into an explicitly
radical and feminist organization" (p. 107). In these cases, as well as those
involving reproductive choice, LEAF presented evidence in support of its argument
that men and women have a different and unequal reality. This argument was
explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in JanzenlGovereau," where
the Court held that sexual harassment against individual women was an instance
of broader sexual discrimination by men against women. However, with the
12
exception of Justice Wilson's decision in Morgentaler, in the rest of the cases
the courts did not specifically endorse LEAF's arguments regarding the historical
disadvantage of women, although in several instances LEAF was not unhappy
with the courts' final results.
Having finished her discussion of LEAF's strategy, Razack concludes by
asking the crucial question: What counts as winning? She is careful to distinguish
the litigator's answer from that of the historian. From a litigator's point of view, it
is the court's final order that counts. But, as Razack notes, courts often come to
the "right conclusion for the wrong reasons" (p. 128). In a few cases, the courts
gave the right result based on the right reasons (an analysis of women's historical
inequality). In others, the courts came up with the right result for reasons which
did not explicitly refer to women's inequality. Moreover, simply obtaining the
right result for the right reasons (no mean feat in itself) is not sufficient to improve
women's situations. As Razack shows, women's equality was harder to secure
when it required a change in bureaucratic practice, especially where that change
required additional governmental expenditure. Thus, Razack concludes that
a legal nor a political challenge can be sustained without regard to the
alternative values one espouses or how to win recognition for them politically. In
this sense, legal challenges that end up on the bureaucratic treadmill, as many do,
cannot result in long-term gain unless there is a clearly articulated political vision
and one that finds support in the feminist community (p. 130).
[n]either
...

But, according to Razack, a broader political vision is precisely what LEAF
lacked. The questions Schneider offers as a guide to social movements for
evaluating the direction of their rights litigation strategies presuppose both a
larger political analysis and some accountablity to wider political movements.
11. JanzenlGovereauv.Platy Enterprises(1989), 89 C.L.L.C. 17,011.
12. R. v. Morgentaler,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
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Surely, before we can evaluate LEAF's litigation strategy we need an answer to
the initial question of what broader political vision of social transformation LEAF
endorses. Only then can we evaluate whether a particular strategy, rights litigation,
brings the organization closer to its ultimate goal. However, Razack acknowledges
that LEAF has recognized the need to extend itself in these directions, and to this
end it is working in coalition with immigrant and women's communities in some
of the newer challenges.
From an historian's perspective, a proactive rights litigation strategy must be
evaluated in terms of how it transforms power relations in society and not simply
on how it redistributes benefits. Referring to the work of Michael Mandel on the
legalization of politics, Razack acknowledges that "Charter activities, like equality
activities on the whole, exert a force that negates transformation and keeps the
focus on a fairer distribution of resources" (p. 135). According to Mandel, this is
because rights litigation detaches form from substance and leaves power relations
untouched. By contrast, Razack adopts a more sanguine view of Charter litigation
on the ground that "[fleminists in the courtroom are primarily concerned with
resisting this built-in feature of the discourse in which they work, insisting on
transformation and on context" (p. 135).
For Razack, the transformative power of rights litigation lies in the ability of
organizations like LEAF to name women's oppression in court. She, like many
cautious supporters of rights litigation, emphasizes the counter-hegemonic potential
of rights discourse.1 3 But it is difficult to see how naming women's experience in
court has such a potentially transformative effect. As Razack notes, in several of
LEAF's early cases the courts simply ignored LEAF's evidence of women's
experience in reaching its decisions. And even when the courts rely on a
contextualized understanding of women's inequality to reach a decision, it is not
clear how this change in legal discourse is transmitted into the broader political
debate or, even more importantly, how it contributes to social change. Although
she is critical of LEAF's approach to social change through reasoned argument
(pp. 43-44), it is not clear that Razack's stress on the importance of bringing
women's experience before the courts is substantially different. In both cases,
what is missing is a theory of social change.
Razack emphasizes the importance of looking for cracks in the law where
feminist values may seep in to change the system. But the problem with this
strategy is that it does not allow us to distinguish cracks which are cosmetic from
ones which may be structural. Analyzing law as discourse does not distinguish
between forms of law, the different levels of the social formation in which law
operates or the different capacities of opposing groups to mobilize legal challenges.
Simply characterizing law as discourse and describing discourse as "the twin
operation of power and knowledge" (p. 19) begs more questions than it answers.

13. Herman, supra,note 2; Bartholomew and Hunt, supra,note 1; Schneider, supra, note 2.
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It may well be that a postnodern analysis of law has a great deal to offer
feminists, 4 but this is not demonstrated by Razack's suggestive remarks.
The same is true of Razack's attempt to complicate the concept of women's
experience, which is crucial for feminist jurisprudence, by invoking a postmodern
emphasis on difference. She is critical of the concept of women's experience
employed by LEAF not only because it sets up a dichotomy between men and
women, but also because of the unacknowledged universalism concealed in the
phrase (p. 24). Razack fears that unless the differences between women are
acknowledged and explored by feminists, this concept will tend to foster the
agenda of elite women at the expense of disadvantaged women. By this she means
that feminists should be careful to attend to how race and class differences
between women impact upon the development of a feminist political agenda. But
it is unclear how her emphasis on the differences between women advances the
political debate any further than LEAF's attention to the double disadvantage,
such as race and class, which some women experience. Although Razack identifies
the need to use analytical models which are based upon the indivisibility and
simultaneity of oppressions, (p. 133) she does not provide us with any guidance
about how this may be done within a postmodernist framework.
CanadianFeminism and the Law provides an excellent case study of the origins
of LEAF and its litigation strategy. Sherene Razack's analysis of how the litigation
process and traditional equality doctrines filter out women's experiences of
subordination and LEAF's attempt to counter these tendencies by developing a
feminist approach to equality rights litigation is subtle and thoughtful. Many of
her comments about law, rights discourse and women's oppression, although not
developed, are suggestive of lines of inquiry which those of us interested in the
rights debate as it relates to feminism and progressive social movements should
explore. The problem is that until Razack provides some account of how social
change occurs and how various forms of oppression are involved in social relations
it is difficult to accept her cautious endorsement of rights litigation. What is
needed is a fuller account of the social theory informing Razack's assessment.
However, this theoretical endeavour must necessarily be supplemented by precisely
the kind of detailed case study which Razack provides if we are to be confident in
our evaluation of the transformative potential of the politics of rights.

14. Carol Smart, Feminism and the Powerof the Law (London: Routledge, 1989).

